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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 971018-CA
Plaintiff / Appellee,
v.
PHILIP E. HOLLEN,
Defendant / Appellant

NOTICE OF ERRATA

COMES NOW Defendant / Appellant, Philip E. Hollen, by and
through counsel, Scott L Wiggins, of and for Arnold & Wiggins,
P . C , and files this Notice of Errata in the Brief of Appellant,
which was previously filed with this Court on September 14, 1999,
On page 35 of Argument III1 of the Brief of Appellant, counsel

Argument III of the Brief of Appellant addresses appointed
trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on the
lesser included offense of unlawful detention. See Brief of
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for Defendant / Appellant inadvertently cited the wrong version
of the Aggravated Kidnaping statute.

Counsel intended to set

forth the following version of the Aggravated Kidnaping statute,
which reads in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if
the person intentionally or knowingly,
without authority of law and against the will
of the victim, by any means and in any
manner, seizes, confines, detains, or
transports the victim:
(a) and in committing, attempting to
commit, or in the immediate flight after
the attempt or commission of the
kidnaping, the actor possesses, uses, or
threatens to use a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) with intent:
(ii) to facilitate the
commission, attempted commission,
or flight after commission or
attempted commission of a felony;

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302

(Supp. 1999).

The undersigned counsel

emphasizes that this corrected citation of the Aggravated

Appellant, p. 34
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Kidnaping statute in no way affects the force or substance of
Argument III set forth in the Brief of Appellant.
DATED this 15th day of September, 1999.
V D \ WIGGINS, P.C.

_Scott^£r Wigc
Attorneys (Eojj* Defendant /
Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
NOTICE OF ERRATA by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following on this 15th day of September, 1999:
Ms. Christine F. Soltis
Criminal Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake Cit\(7SJT 84114-0854
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether appointed trial counsel, by failing to have the

trial court make the requisite constitutional determination as to
the admissibility of the eyewitness identification, deprived
Defendant of his constitutional rights to due process and the
effective assistance of counsel.

To make such a showing,

Defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a deficient
performance, falling below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance
was prejudicial.

Bundy v. DeLand,

763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988).

Such claims present mixed questions of law and fact.

5
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Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984).

When available, the appellate court defers to the trial court's
findings of fact, but reviews its application of legal principles
to its factual findings for correctness.

State

v.

Hay,

859 P.2d

1, 4-5 (Utah 1993).
2.

Whether appointed trial counsel, based on the

unwarranted assumption of Defendant's guilt, breached his duty of
loyalty to Defendant and thereby deprived Defendant of his
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel by
failing to accurately advise Defendant of the surrounding
circumstances of his constitutional right to testify.

In

addition to the two-prong test discussed above, the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland

recognized that prejudice may be

presumed when there has been actual or constructive denial of
counsel.

Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct.

2052, 2067 (1984) . Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court noted that
the appellate court may, pursuant to '"inherent supervisory power
over the courts'" presume prejudice in circumstances where it is
"'unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to
weigh actual prejudice.'"

Parsons

v. Barnes,

871 P.2d 516, 523

n.6 (Utah), cert, denied,

513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994)

(quoting State v. Brown,

853 P.2d 851, 857, 859 (Utah 1992)).
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3.

Whether appointed trial counsel, by failing to request

a jury instruction concerning the lesser included offense of
unlawful restraint, deprived defendant of his constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel.

See discussion of

the standard of review for the review of claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel set forth above in Statement of Issue /
Standards of Review No. 1.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel, and the constitutional right of an accused
to have the trial court determine the constitutional reliability
of eyewitness identifications prior to consideration of the same
by a jury.
Several months after the robbery at issue in this appeal,
Mr. Hollen was charged with aggravated robbery, aggravated
kidnaping, and aggravated assault.

At trial, five reputed

eyewitnesses testified and identified Mr. Hollen as one of the
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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robbers.

Mr. Hollen was subsequently convicted and this appeal

followed.
Pursuant to a Rule 23B Motion filed by Mr. Hollen, this
Court remanded this case to the trial court for a Rule 23B
evidentiary hearing on various issues of ineffective assistance
of counsel.

After various proceedings, which included a hearing

on the requested amendment of the initial findings of fact, the
trial court signed the Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of
Fact.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In the early morning hours on June 25, 1995, two

individuals robbed the Cinemark 10 movie theaters in Layton, Utah
(R. 7, Affidavit for Warrant of Arrest; R. 101, Transcript of
Trial, Vol. I ) .
2.

Witnesses gave descriptions of the two robbers.

Among

other things, they described one as blond and wearing cowboy
boots (R. 509, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No.
2).

The witnesses described the other as dark with Hispanic

coloring and wearing a white gauze bandage on his left cheek
see

also

(Id;

R. 103, lines 7-11, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I ) ; R.

163, Transcript of Trial (Vol. II); Id.

at R. 192-93; Id.

216) .

8
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at R.

3.

There was no physical evidence found at the scene (R.

509, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 3) .
4.

Initially, two suspects other than Mr. Hollen and his

co-defendant, Mr. Jeffrey D. Mecham, were considered by police
{Id.

at R. 509, No. 4 ) .
5.

One suspect, Mr. Michael Cantu, was dark complected

with Hispanic coloring and had been seen with a gauze bandage
similar to the one described by witnesses as being worn by one
the robbers {Id.

at R. 510, No. 5; R. 103-04, R. 125, Transcript

of Trial, Vol. I ) .
6.

The Layton City Police Department assembled a black and

white photo lineup that included a picture of Mr. Cantu, which
was presented to witnesses (R. 510, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing
Findings of Fact, No. 6; R. 104, lines 12-23, R. 105, Transcript
of Trial (Vol. I ) . Upon viewing the black and white photo
lineup, one

of the witnesses, Ms. Megan Brimhall, "said that Mr.

Cantu looked quite similar to the person that she had in mind"
(R. 107, lines 1-4, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I ) . Thereafter,
upon viewing the color photos of Mr. Cantu, Ms. Brimhall "backed
up a step and put her hand to her mouth" and began shaking.

She

then stated, "That looks like him" (R. 107, lines 5-16,
Transcript of Trial (Vol. I ) ; R. 510, Rule 23B Evidentiary
Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 6 ) . Various other witnesses picked
9
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Mr. Cantu's picture and identified it as looking like the robber
with the bandage (R. 108, lines 16-20, R. 109, lines 12-14, R.
127-28, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I).
7.

The police arrested Mr. Cantu and conducted a physical

lineup at which one of the witnesses, Ms. Heidi Maroney,
identified Mr. Cantu as both the person that sounded like and was
most like the robber with the bandage (Id.

at R. 112-13).

Cantu, however, was subsequently released (Id.

Mr.

at R. 113, lines

13-24) .
8.

A second individual, Mr. Dennis Dougherty, also became

a suspect when a search of his residence revealed gauze bandages
and cowboy boots similar to those allegedly worn by the robbers
{Id.

at R. 114-15) . When officers showed the bandage and tape to

the witnesses, they identified the bandage and medical tape as
being ''identical" to that utilized by the robber with the bandage
(Id.

at R. 128-29).

Notwithstanding, the Layton City Police

Department did not inquire of the Salt Lake Police Department
whether a co-defendant that matched the robber with the bandage
was under investigation (Id.

at R. 238, lines 20-24) . The police

prepared a photo lineup that included Mr. Dougherty's picture and
showed the lineup to witnesses, but none of the witnesses could
identify Mr. Dougherty as one of the robbers (Id.

at R. 115-16).

10
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9.

About four months after the robbery, the Salt Lake City

Police Department contacted the Layton City Police Department and
provided the names of Mr. Philip E. Hollen and Mr. Jeffrey D.
Mecham1 as suspects because of their alleged involvement in what
were thought to be similar robberies in Salt Lake County (Id.

at

R. 116, lines 14-19).
10.

Shortly thereafter, the Layton City Police Department

prepared a photo lineup containing six photographs, one of which
was that of Mr. Hollen and presented the photo lineup to various
witnesses (Id.

at R. 116, lines 14-19) .

Each witness identified

the photo of Mr. Hollen as being one of the robbers (Id.

at R.

118-22).
11.

Mr. Hollen was subsequently charged with aggravated

robbery, aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated assault (R. 10-11,
Information), to which he pleaded not guilty (R. 12, Minute Entry
- Notice).
12.

Mr. William J. Albright, a public defender, was

appointed to represent Mr. Hollen (R. 511, Rule 23B Evidentiary
Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 14).

l

See companion appeal entitled State
971013-CA.

v. Mecham,

11
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Case No.

13.

The police also arrested and charged Mr. Mecham, who

was appointed Mr. Glen T. Cella as counsel (Id.

at R. 511, No.

15) .
14.

At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Hollen and Mr. Mecham

were present and represented by their respective appointed
attorneys {Id.

at R. 512, No. 18). Various eyewitnesses were

present at the Preliminary Hearing, who were "not called as
witnesses," but appeared at the hearing just "to see what was
going on." (R. 85, lines 18-19, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I).
While at the Preliminary Hearing, the various eyewitnesses viewed
Mr. Hollen and Mecham and recognized them as the accused while
they were in custody, wearing handcuffs and jail clothing (Id.

at

R. 85, lines 19-21).
15.

After the Preliminary Hearing, both Mr. Hollen and Mr.

Mecham were bound over for trial (R. 513, Rule 23B Evidentiary
Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 22).
16.

Prior to trial, Mr. Hollen sent a letter to his

appointed counsel, Mr. Albright, from prison, in which he asked
Mr. Albright to consider the case of State

v. Ramirez

as it bore

on the eyewitness identification of his case and to consider
filing a motion to suppress the eyewitness identification (R.
470, Letter from Mr. Philip E. Hollen to Mr. William J. Albright,
dated June 5, 1996).

Mr. Hollen further suggested that Mr.
12
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Albright look at the question of merger on the various charges
(Id.)

.

17.

Shortly before trial, Mr. Albright, along with Mr.

Cella, filed a joint Motion in Limine to prohibit the State from
"offering into evidence any reference regarding the
identification of the Defendant by the witnesses arising from
their presence at the Preliminary Hearing of March 27, 1996 and
arising out of the photographic lineup." (R. 486-87, Motion In
Limine)

. The prosecution stipulated to the Motion in Limine

(R.

85, lines 9-22, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I). Neither the Motion
nor the discussion in chambers between the trial court and
counsel concerning the Motion included any identification of
which witnesses were present at the Hearing or the legal effects
of the eyewitnesses having viewed the accused under the
circumstances {Id.).

In fact, Mr. Albright, as trial counsel,

was not aware of the identity of the eyewitnesses present at the
Preliminary Hearing even though he was aware that the
eyewitnesses had viewed Mr. Hollen and Mr. Mecham at the
Preliminary Hearing as the accused robbers in custody, wearing
handcuffs and jail clothing (Id.

at R. 85, lines 19-21; see

also

R. 513, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 21).
18.

At trial, Mr. Albright and Mr. Cella jointly moved to

dismiss the aggravated kidnaping and aggravated assault charges
13
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based on the legal principle of merger (R. 264-66, Transcript of
Trial (Vol. II). The prosecution opposed the Motion as to
aggravated kidnaping but did not oppose the Motion as it related
to aggravated assault {Id.
19.

at R. 266-68) .

The trial court denied the Motion as it related to

aggravated kidnaping and granted the Motion by dismissing the
aggravated assault charge {Id.

at R. 2 68-69).

In the course

ruling on the Motion, however, the trial court stated "that in
the event of conviction, any sentence would merge and it would be
essentially as one crime." {Id.
20.

at R. 269, lines 3-5).

As appointed trial counsel, Mr. Albright discussed with

Mr. Hollen his right to testify.

From the beginning, Mr. Hollen

initially told Mr. Albright that he would not accept a plea
bargain, that he wanted to go to trial, and that he would not
testify.

Consequently, Mr. Albright spent little time discussing

Mr. Hollen's right to testify with him (R. 517, Rule 23B
Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 37) .
21.

With knowledge that Mr. Hollen had a prior conviction

for aggravated robbery, and that there were, at the time, similar
charges pending against Mr. Hollen in Salt Lake County, Mr.
Albright recommended to Mr. Hollen that he not testify, and Mr.
Hollen followed that advice {Id.

at R. 517, No. 38-39).

14
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22.

At trial, five reputed eyewitnesses testified and

identified Mr. Hollen as one of the robbers (R. 145-264,
Transcript of Trial (Vol. II). Mr. Hollen was subsequently
convicted and this appeal followed (R. 26-27, Judgment; R. 28-30,
Notice of Appeal).
23.

Pursuant to the Rule 23B Motion filed by Mr. Hollen,

this Court remanded this case for a Rule 23B evidentiary hearing
on various issues of ineffective assistance of counsel (R. 37476, Order Granting Appellant's Rule 23B Motion).
24.

At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Albright, among other

things, testified that the first reason for not wanting to have
Mr. Hollen testify at trial was that, based in his investigation,
he did not want Mr. Hollen to testify because "he was the one
that committed this crime." (R. 521, Transcript on Appeal (Rule
23B Evidentiary Hearing), p. 43, lines 19-20; R. 517, Rule 23B
Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 40) . Mr. Albright
based his determination not only on his investigation, but on the
fact that Mr. Hollen "had a similar charge in Salt Lake for armed
robbery", and that Mr. Hollen had the same co-defendant in his
Salt Lake County case as he had in this case (R. 521, Transcript
on Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing), pp. 43-44; R. 517, Rule
23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 40). Mr. Albright
also grounded his determination that Mr. Hollen had committed the
15
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crime on the fact that u[h]e never denied the offense." (R. 521,
Transcript on Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing), p. 44, line
25, pp. 44-45; R. 517, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of
Fact, No. 40). According to Mr. Albright's testimony, this was
the "first" reason or basis for his "feelings" that Mr. Hollen
should not testify at the trial (R. 521, Transcript on Appeal
(Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing), p. 46, lines 4-8; R. 517, Rule
23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 40).
25.

After various subsequent proceedings, which included a

hearing on the requested amendment of the initial findings of
fact (R. 397-403, Motion to Amend and/or Clarify Findings of
Fact), the trial court signed the Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing
Findings of Fact2 (R. 519, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings
of Fact).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Hollen of his

constitutional rights to due process and the effective assistance
of counsel by not presenting the issue concerning the
admissibility of eyewitness identification to the trial court.
By failing to do so, appointed trial counsel precluded Mr. Hollen

2

The Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact were
approved by the State (See R. 519, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing
Findings of Fact).
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from that which he was entitled, namely, a preliminary
determination of whether the eyewitness identification was
sufficiently reliable so as not to deny him of due process under
the Utah Constitution if such evidence is considered by the jury.
The only defense available to Mr. Hollen at trial and the
issue of central importance in this case was that of the
unreliability of the eyewitness identifications.

None of the

identifications in this case were impervious to attack under the
criteria set forth in Long and Ramirez.

Furthermore, the

identifications at trial were tainted by the witnesses' exposure
to Mr. Hollen at the Preliminary Hearing, where the witnesses
recognized Mr. Hollen and his co-defendant, Mr. Mecham, as the
accused while they were in custody, wearing handcuffs and jail
clothing.
In sum, appointed trial counsel rendered objectively
deficient performance by failing to require the trial court to
analyze and make a preliminary determination as to the
constitutional admissibility of the eyewitness identifications.
Had trial counsel requested such a determination, there exists a
high likelihood that the trial judge would have determined, at
least in part, such eyewitness identifications to be inadmissible
at trial.

Consequently, the entire evidentiary picture is

affected by trial counsel's failure.
17
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2.

Appointed trial counsel, based on the unwarranted

assumption of guilt, breached his duty of loyalty to Defendant
and thereby deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel by failing to accurately advise
Defendant of the surrounding circumstances of his constitutional
right to testify.

As evinced by the trial court's Rule 23B

Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, appointed trial counsel,
based on his unsubstantiated opinion that Mr. Hollen was guilty,
constructively denied Mr. Hollen of the effective assistance of
counsel and breached his duty of loyalty to Mr. Hollen as his
client.
3.

By failing to request a jury instruction concerning the

lesser included offense of unlawful restraint, appointed trial
counsel deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel.

Appointed trial counsel's

failure to timely request that jury instruction be given on the
lesser included offense of unlawful detention fell below an
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment in light
of existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-402(4), and Utah case law.

But for trial counsel's

deficient performance of failing to request such an instruction,
Mr. Hollen would have had the opportunity to have the jury
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consider and acquit him of the greater offense and convict him of
the lesser, namely, unlawful detention.

ARGUMENTS
INTRODUCTION:

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

In Strickland

v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052

(1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong
test for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment3 right to
effective assistance of counsel has been denied.
S.Ct. at 1064.

Id.

at 687, 104

Utah courts adopted this test, which follows: "To

prevail, a defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant."

Bundy

(Utah 1988); see

v.

1998); accord
State v.

Frame,

also

State

State
v.

Templin,

v.

Chacon,

Deland,

763 P.2d 803, 805

962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah

805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990);

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); State

v.

Perry,

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) State
v. Wright,
893
P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "[T]he right to the

3

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."
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effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused to receive a fair trial."

Lockhart

v.

Fretwell,

506 U.S.

364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993).
In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant
must '"identify the acts or omissions' which, under the
circumstances, 'show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.'" Templin,
(quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066,

2064 (footnotes omitted); see also
(quoting Parsons
denied,

805 P.2d at 186

v.

Barnes,

Chacon,

962 P.2d at 50
cert,

871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah),

513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994)).

A defendant must

"overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered
adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional
judgment."
cert, denied,

State v.

Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989),

497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).

To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support

u

a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different."
Strickland,
at 187.

466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,

805 P.2d

"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome."

Strickland,

466 U.S. at
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695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons,
at 405.

871 P.2d at 522; Frame,

723 P.2d

In the process of arriving at this determination, the

appellate court "should consider the totality of the evidence,
taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the
entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how
strongly the verdict is supported by the record."
P.2d at 187; see also

State

v. Hovater,

Templin,

805

914 P.2d 37, 39-40 (Utah

1996) .
I.

BY FAILING TO HAVE THE TRIAL COURT MAKE THE
REQUISITE CONSTITUTIONAL DETERMINATION AS TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION,
TRIAL COUNSEL DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

In State v. Ramirez,

817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah

Supreme Court set forth the procedure to be followed and the
factors to be considered by a trial court in determining the
reliability of eyewitness testimony under the due process clause
of the Utah Constitution.4

Id.

at 778-84.

In the course of so

doing, the Utah Supreme Court gave a broad overview of the law
surrounding the admissibility of eyewitness identifications,
which included a discussion about the separate and distinct roles
of the prosecutor, judge, and jury.

Id.

at 778.

4

See Utah Const, art. I, § 7, which provides, "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."
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According to Ramirez,

"[t]he burden of demonstrating the

admissibility of the proffered evidence is on the prosecution" to
lay the requisite foundation.

Id.

Such a foundation is

necessary for the trial court to make the necessary preliminary
factual findings and legal conclusions concerning admissibility.
Id.5

The judge, "as arbiter of the constitutional admissibility

of an identification," is "required to scrutinize proffered
evidence for constitutional defects."
Nelson,

Id.;

see

also

950 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

State

v.

If presented

with the issue of the admissibility of eyewitness identification,
the trial judge must preliminariliy determine whether the
identification is sufficiently reliable so as not to deny the
accused of due process if considered by the jury.
P.2d at 778.

Ramirez,

817

If admissible, the jury determines the weight to be

given to such evidence.

Id.

In the course of discussing the roles of the judge and jury,
the Utah Supreme Court expressed concern about the " [p]otential
for role confusion and for erosion of constitutional guarantees
inhere[nt] in th[e] overlap of responsibility of judge and jury .
Id.

. ."

Accordingly, the Court emphasized the need for the

trial court not to "abdicate its charge as gatekeeper to
5

"The defendant is entitled to a determination by the court
of the evidence's constitutional admissibility." State
v.
Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991).
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carefully scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional
defects . . . ."

Id.

Consequently, under Ramirez,

the trial

court must initially determine whether eyewitness testimony is
constitutionally reliable prior to it being admitted.
In determining whether an eyewitness identification is
constitutionally reliable, the trial court must consider the
following pertinent factors:
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view
the actor during the event; (2) the witness's
degree of attention to the actor at the time
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to
observe the event, including his or her
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the
witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event
being observed and the likelihood that the
witness would perceive, remember and relate
it correctly. This last area includes such
factors as whether the event was an ordinary
one in the mind of the observer during the
time it was observed, and whether the race of
the actor was the same as the observer's.
Id.

at 781 (quoting State v. Long,

721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah

1986)) . "The ultimate question to be determined is whether,
under the totatity of the circumstances, the identification was
reliable."

Id.

In the instant case, appointed trial counsel denied Mr.
Hollen of his constitutional rights to due process and the
effective assistance of counsel by not presenting the issue
23
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concerning the admissibility of eyewitness identification to the
trial court.

By failing to do so, appointed trial counsel

precluded Mr. Hollen from that which he was entitled, namely, a
preliminary determination of whether the eyewitness
identification was sufficiently reliable so as not to deny him of
due process under the Utah Constitution if such evidence is
considered by the jury.
The only defense available to Mr. Hollen at trial and the
issue of central importance in this case was that of the
unreliability of the eyewitness identifications.

Well-settled

Utah case law discusses and summarizes the empirical studies
questioning the reliability of eyewitness identification.
Ramirez,

817 P.2d at 779-80; Long,

721 P.2d at 488-92.

"The

studies all lead inexorably to the conclusion that human
perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited and
fallible."

Long,

721 P.2d at 488.

Notwithstanding the fact that empirical research
demonstrates the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness
identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of such
problems.

"People simply do not accurately understand the

deleterious effects that certain variables can have on the
accuracy of the memory process of an honest eyewitness."
v.

Maestas,

367 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Utah April 9, 1999).
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State
In

fact, "the common knowledge that people do possess often runs
contrary to documented research findings."

Id.

Because people

do not appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness identifications,
they often give eyewitness testimony undue weight.

Long,

721

P.2d at 490.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Ramirez,

as previously

discussed, leads to the conclusion that trial counsel faced with
eyewitness identification of varying degrees of certainty and
consistency should request and thus require the trial court to
make a preliminary determination as to the constitutional
reliability of the eyewitness identification.

Such a preliminary

determination ensures the constitutional admissibility of the
eyewitness identification; thereby protecting the accused's
constitutional right to due process.
None of the identifications in this case were impervious to
attack under the criteria set forth in Long and Ramirez.

All of

the witnesses had a limited opportunity to view the actor and a
limited degree of attention during the event.

See R. 156-57,

Transcript of Trial (Vol. II) ("Combined thirty seconds maybe" to
view actor and w[t]he whole he had me facing away");6 Id.

6

at R.

Mark Mudrow, one of the eyewitnesses, testified at trial
that on the night of the robbery he was not wearing his glasses,
which he wears so that he can see distances. See R. 164-65,
Transcript of Trial (Vol. II).
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171-72 (dim lighted theater); Id.

at R. 180, lines 13-16 ("Maybe

two or three seconds"); Id. at 184 ("pretty dark . . . not well
lit"); Id.

at R. 184 ("Facing the wall the entire time"); Id. at

R. 202, lines 20-24 ("Maybe four or five seconds"); Id.

at R.

217-18 (witness initially told detective that she was "looking
away from the Hispanic-looking suspect"); Id.

at R. 232-33

("Wasn't aware of the other one", i.e., the suspect with bandage
on face); Id.

at R. 249, lines 1-6 ("Close to a minute"). The

robbery was completed quickly and at least one half of the
actor's face was obstructed with a large bandage.

See id.

at R.

162, lines 21-24; R. 163, lines 13-42.
In addition, there was approximately a four-month time lapse
between the robbery and the time when Mr. Hollen became a suspect
of the robbery.

Id.

at R. 101; R. 116, lines 14-19 (third time

Police received information concerning possible suspects).

Prior

to that, two of the witnesses at trial had identified another
individual by the name of Michael Cantu from a photo lineup as
the actor or robber with the bandage on his face.
07; R. 108, lines 16-20.

Id.

at R. 106-

In fact, when one of the witnesses was

shown the photographs of Mr. Cantu, she "backed up a step and put
her hand to her mouth" and began shaking.
9-15.

Id.

at R. 107, lines

She then stated, "That looks like him." Id.

at R. 107,

lines 15-16.
26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Additionally, due to the fact that the nature of the event
being observed was a robbery, there existed a low likelihood that
the witnesses would perceive, remember, and relate it correctly.7
See,

e.g.,

id.

at R. 164, lines 12-13 ("frightened"); Id.

181, line 4 ("I was scared to death"); Id.
("extremely scared"); Id.

at R.

at R. 184, lines 10-12

at R. 184, lines 14-17 ("nervous and

scared, crying and -- . . . upset . . . unstable"); Id.

at R.

247, lines 5-8 (pointing gun around at "all of us"); Id.
249, lines 19-20 ("I was scared").

at R.

Moreover, some of the

witnesses were making what they initially thought was a crossracial identification.

Id.

at R. 216, lines 5-18; R. 103, lines

7-11; R. 192-93.
Furthermore, the identifications at trial were tainted by
the witnesses' exposure to Mr. Hollen at the Preliminary Hearing,
where the witnesses recognized Mr. Hollen and his co-defendant,
Mr. Mecham, as the accused while they were in custody, wearing
handcuffs and jail clothing.

Id.

at R. 85, lines 19-21.

Notwithstanding the knowledge of the tainted identifications,
appointed trial counsel, other than an ineffectual motion in
limine, made no effort to identify the extent of the tainted
7

This low likelihood is also due in part to the previously
discussed passage of time from when the robbery occurred and when
Mr. Hollen became a suspect. Further, the low likelihood is
evinced by the apparent inaccurate or false identifications of
Mr. Cantu by the witnesses a short time after the robbery.
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identifications or to expressly exclude by name the witnesses
present at the Preliminary Hearing.
Limine.

See R. 486-87, Motion In

Neither the Motion nor the discussion in chambers

between the trial court and counsel concerning the Motion
included any identification of which witnesses were present at
the Hearing or the legal effects of the eyewitnesses having
viewed the accused under the circumstances that they did.

In

fact, trial counsel was not aware of the identity of the
eyewitnesses present at the Preliminary Hearing even though he
was aware that the eyewitnesses had viewed Mr. Hollen and his codefendant at the Preliminary Hearing as the accused robbers in
custody, wearing handcuffs and jail clothing (Id.
19-21; see

also

at R. 85, lines

R. 513, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of

Fact, No. 21. 8
In sum, under the facts of this case, appointed trial
counsel rendered objectively deficient performance by failing to
require the trial court to analyze and make a preliminary
determination as to the constitutional admissibility of the
eyewitness identifications.

Had trial counsel requested such a

determination, there exists a high likelihood that the trial
judge would have determined, at least in part, such eyewitness

Appointed trial counsel did not present expert testimony
regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification.
State
v. Maestas,
367 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Utah April 9, 1999).
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identifications to be inadmissible at trial.

Consequently, the

entire evidentiary picture is affected by trial counsel's
failure, especially in light of the fact that the verdict is not
strongly supported by the record.

Finally, the record does not

reveal any reasonable tactic that would mitigate or ameliorate
the deficiency.
The failure of trial counsel to request the constitutional
preliminary determination as to the admissibility of the
eyewitness identifications seriously undermined the fairness of
Mr. Hollen's trial.
1993).

See

State

v.

Young,

853 P.2d 327, 367 (Utah

Moreover, the omission by appointed trial counsel went to

the heart of Mr. Hollen's defense -- that Mr. Hollen was
mistakenly identified as the robber with the bandage, who
initially was thought to have Hispanic features.
II.

APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL, BASED ON THE UNWARRANTED
ASSUMPTION OF GUILT, BREACHED HIS DUTY OF LOYALTY
TO DEFENDANT AND THEREBY DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ACCURATELY ADVISE
DEFENDANT OF THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TESTIFY.

In determining whether trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective, the appellate court applies the two-prong test
established in Strickland

v.

S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); see
282 (Utah 1995).

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

also

v.

Taylor

Warden,

905 P.2d 277,

The two-prong test is discussed in detail
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above, and, as a result, will not be reiterated here except for
the discussion which follows concerning the prejudice prong of
the test.
In Strickland,

the United States Supreme Court recognized

that prejudice may be presumed when there has been actual or
Strickland,

constructive denial of counsel.
S.Ct. at 2 067.9

466 U.S. at 692, 104

Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court noted that

the appellate court may, pursuant to "xinherent supervisory power
over the courts'" presume prejudice in circumstances where it is
^unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to
Parsons

weigh actual prejudice.'"

v.

Barnes,

871 P.2d 516, 523

n.6 (Utah), cert, denied,

513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994)

(quoting State v. Brown,

853 P.2d 851, 857, 859 (Utah 1992)).

Moreover, * [c]ritical to the attorney-client relationship
and the integrity of the judicial proceedings is an attorney's
duty to represent the interests of a client with zeal and
loyalty."

State v.

Holland,

876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994).

So

essential is the duty of loyalty to the judicial system that "its
faithful discharge is mandated not only by the Rules of

9

See also Kimmelman v. Morrison,
Ml U.S. 365, 374, 106
S.Ct. 2574, 2582 (1986) ("The essence of an ineffectiveassistance claim is that counsel's
unprofessional
errors
so upset
the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the
trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect")
(Emphasis added).
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Professional Conduct,10 but also, in criminal cases, by the Sixth
Amendment right of a criminal defendant to the effective
assistance of counsel."

Id.

(citing United

States

U.S. 648, 656-57, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2045-46 (1984)).

v.

Cronic,

466

"In almost

all cases, defendants are wholly dependent on the dedication of
their attorneys to protect their interests and to ensure their
fair treatment under the law."

Id.

In the instant case, on remand for an evidentiary hearing on
the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court
made the following Findings of Fact with respect to Mr. Hollen's
waiver of the right to testify in reliance upon trial counsel's
advice:
Mr. Albright discussed with Defendant
his right to testify. From the beginning,
Mr. Hollen told Mr. Albright that he would
not accept a plea bargain, that he wanted to
go to trial, and that he would not testify.
Because of Mr. Hollen's position, Mr.
Albright spent little time discussing Mr.
Hollen's right to testify with him.
Mr. Albright was aware that Mr. Hollen
had a prior conviction for aggravated
robbery, and that he had been on parole from
prison at the time of the robbery in June of
1995. He was also aware that similar charges
were pending in Salt Lake County for robbery
of the Million Dollar Saloon. In that case,
it was alleged that Mr. Hollen was also
involved with Mr. Mecham, and that they had
used small .22-caliber pistols. Mr. Hollen
had been shot in that case at the scene. Mr.

'See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 cmt.
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Albright was also aware that Mr. Hollen was a
suspect in the robbery of Century 31 theaters
in Salt Lake City.
With that background, Mr. Albright
recommended to Mr. Hollen that he not
testify, and Mr. Hollen agreed to follow that
advice. Mr. Hollen acknowledged that he did
not want to testify on the record out of the
presence of the jury at the time of trial.
During Mr. Albright's testimony given at
the Rule 23B evidentiary hearing, the
first

reason given by Mr. Albright for not wanting
to have Mr. Hollen testify
at trial was that,
based in his investigation,
he did not want
Mr. Hollen to testify
because "he was the one
that committed this crime. " Mr. Albright
based his determination
not only on his
investigation,
but on the fact that Mr.
Hollen "had a similar charge in Salt Lake for
armed robbery", and that Mr. Hollen had the
same co-defendant
in his Salt Lake County
case as he had in this case.
Mr. Albright
grounded his determination
that Mr. Hollen
had committed the crime on the fact
that
"[h]e never denied the offense."
According
to Mr. Albright's
testimony,
this was the
"first"
reason or basis for "feelings"
that
Mr. Hollen should not testify
at the
trial.
See R. 516-18, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact,
Nos. 37-40 (Emphasis added).
As evinced by the trial court's Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing
Findings of Fact, appointed trial counsel, based on his
unsubstantiated opinion that Mr. Hollen was guilty,
constructively denied Mr. Hollen of the effective assistance of
counsel and breached his duty of loyalty to Mr. Hollen as his
client.

See id.

at R. 517-18, No. 40.

Instead of basing his

legal advice not to testify on a well-reasoned analysis of Utah
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case law concerning the likely consequences of Mr. Hollen's
testimony if he were to testify,11 appointed trial counsel simply
failed to zealously pursue the interests of Mr. Hollen in the
course of advising him not to testify.

See R. 521, Transcript on

Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing), p. 69, lines 3-12.
Rather, with little of no consultation concerning the right to
testify and the benefits and disadvantages of testifying at
trial, trial counsel assumed Mr. Hollen's guilt and then utilized
his unwarranted assumption as the basis for advising Mr. Hollen
to waive his constitutional right to testify.
Rules of Professional Conduct (stating that

u

Cf.

Rule 1.2(a),

[i]n a criminal

case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's decision,
consultation

with

the

lawyer,

after

as to . . . whether the client will

testify") (Emphasis added.). 12
Had trial counsel accurately advised Mr. Hollen concerning
his constitutional right to testify and the fact that his prior
convictions would have been excluded, Mr. Hollen probably would

n

See State
v. Banner,
111 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986) (trial
court abused its discretion by failing to exclude defendant's
previous felony convictions).
12

As evinced by Mr. Hollen's testimony at the Rule 23B
Evidentiary Hearing, he relied upon appointed trial counsel's
advice not to testify because, as Mr. Hollen stated, u [H]e was my
attorney, and [was] supposed to know what he was talking about."
See R. 521, Transcript on Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing) ,
p. 69, lines 11-12) .
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have testified in his own behalf.

See R. 521, Transcript on

Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing), p. 69, lines 13-19.
Admittedly, such testimony would have simply been that he did not
rob the Cinemark 10 movie theaters, and that he had not attended
a movie theater in Layton or Davis County.
lines 23-25.

Id.

at R. 521, p. 69,

However, Mr. Hollen's testimony could have provided

a substantial impact on the jury in the course of its
deliberations inasmuch as his conviction was ultimately based
solely on eyewitness identifications of questionable
constitutional admissibility.

Cf.

State

v.

Arguelles,

921 P.2d

439, 441 (Utah 1996).
III. BY FAILING TO REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION
CONCERNING THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF UNLAWFUL
RESTRAINT, APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DEPRIVED
DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Appointed trial counsel's additional failure to request a
jury instruction for the lesser included offense of unlawful
restraint fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment in light of existing Utah case law and the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4).
402(4) states:

Section 78-1-

"The court shall not be obligated to charge the

jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a
rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense."
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In

State

v.

Baker,

671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court

stated that subsection (4) of § 76-1-402
does not require the court to weigh the
credibility of the evidence, a function
reserved for the trier of fact. The court
must only decide whether there is a
sufficient quantum of evidence presented to
justify sending the question to the jury, a
decision which must be made concerning all
jury instructions in any trial.
Id. at 159.
In State v.

Hill,

674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme

Court held that whether an offense is a lesser included offense
of another offense is determined "by comparing the statutory
elements of the two crimes as a theoretical matter and, where
necessary, by reference to the facts proved at trial."
97; see
State v.

also

State

Branch,

v. McCovey,

Id.

at

803 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 1990);

743 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Utah 1987) .

The elements of aggravated kidnaping are set forth at Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995), which states:
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if
the person intentionally or knowingly,
without authority of law and against the will
of the victim, by any means and in any
manner, seizes, confines, detains, or
transports the victim with intent:
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted
commission, or flight after commission or
attempted commission of a felony;
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In comparison, the elements of unlawful detention are set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304, which states that " [a] person
commits unlawful detention if he knowingly restrains another
unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his [or her]
liberty."13
A comparison of the elements, as set forth above, indicates
that unlawful detention is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish the commission of
aggravated kidnaping.

Based on this comparison, aggravated

kidnaping cannot be committed without necessarily having
committed unlawful detention and thus unlawful detention is a
Cf.

lesser and included offense of aggravated kidnaping.
v.

Bradley,

State

752 P.2d 874, 878 (Utah 1988).

Appointed trial counsel's failure to timely request that
jury instruction be given on the lesser included offense of
unlawful detention fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment in light of existing Utah case law, the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4), and the cited
Utah case law.

But for trial counsel's deficient performance of

failing to request such an instruction, Mr. Hollen would have had
the opportunity to have the jury consider and acquit him of the

Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor.
Ann. § 76-5-304(2) .

See Utah Code
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greater offense and convict him of the lesser, namely, unlawful
detention.

See State

v. Brown,

694 P.2d 587, 589-90 (Utah 1984).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Hollen respectfully requests
that this Court reverse his conviction of Aggravated Robbery and
Aggravated Kidnaping and for such other relief as the Court deems
just and appropriate under the circumstances presented in this
case and arguments set forth herein.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Mr. Hollen requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the novel issues
in the instant appeal dealing with, among other things, the
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and
the right of an accused, under circumstances such as those in the
instant case, to have the trial judge make a preliminary
determination as to the constitutional admissibility of
eyewitness identification.

Moreover, this appeal presents issues

apparently of first impression concerning the waiver of the right
to testify and the question of whether unlawful detention is a
lesser included offense of aggravated kidnaping.

These issues

present matters requiring further development in the area of
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criminal law for the benefit of the bar and public.

Counsel for

Mr. Hollen also requests that the method of disposition of the
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For
Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value and
direction in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of September, 1999,
OLD a WIGGINS, P . C .

• f i G O t t - L WlC^

Attorneyst^fcjr Defendant /
Appellant
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT First Class Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following on this 14th day of September, 1999:
Ms. Christine F. Soltis
Criminal Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake r^Lty/rUT 84114-0854
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ADDENDUM
Addendum A:

Judgement

Addendum B:

Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact
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MELVIN C. WILSON 3513
Davis County Attorney
800 West S t a t e S t r e e t
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICTAE[p^TRrfqT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

JUDGMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 961700231

PHILIP E. HOLLEN,
Hon. Rodney S. Page, Judge

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for sentence on the
17th day of July, 1996, the defendant being present in person and
represented by his attorney, William J. Albright, the State being
represented by Steven V. Major, the Honorable Rodney S. Page,
Judge, presiding.
The defendant having been convicted upon a finding of
guilty of the offenses of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony
and Aggravated Kidnaping, a first degree felony, and the Court
having asked if the defendant had anything to say why judgment
should not be pronounced; and no sufficient cause to the contrary
being shown or appearing to the Court;
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the
offenses

of Aggravated

Robbery,

a

first

degree

w

felony,

JUDGMENT, ENTERED
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and

Aggravated

Kidnaping, a first degree

felony,

as charged and

convicted.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and
imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of
five years to life on each count, and is ordered to pay $11,500
restitution jointly and severally with Jeffrey Devon Mecham, as
provided by law.

Parties notified of judgment in open court.

Pursuant to Judgment and Commitment executed by the Court
on the 17th day of July, 1996, the defendant has been transported
to the Utah State Prison.

It is recommended by the Court that the

sentence herein ordered run concurrently with each other and
consecutively with any other sentence the defendant is presently
serving at the Utah State Prison.

DATED this _2£T^day of g^^JT

' 1996-

BY THE COURT:

JUDGE(J
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
_ ^Delivered an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Judgment
this c*2
day of August, 1996, to William J. Albright, Attorney
for Defendant.
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SCOTi L vvIGGINS, Bai No M.M
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C
Amencan Plaza II, Suite 105
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Ul 84101
Telephone- (801)328-4^3
Facsimile: \M) 1)328-4^1
Attorneys for Defendant

\pi -ii

i .in

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNT\
STATE OF UTAH
FARMINGTON DFPARTMFNT

STATE OF UTAH,

)
)
j

Plaintiff' Appellee,

Case No. 961700231
Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 971018-CA

)
)
)

PHILIP E. HOI LEN,

)
)

Defendant Appellant.

)

Judge Rodnc\ S Wwe

F U N ' HI! MJiJi N l l l i n HEARING FINDINGS OF FACT

After temporary remand by the Utah Court ul \p|u\

; , " •• nil lo Rult

}

Ui I 'l.ili

Rules of Appellate Procedure, the above-entitled matter came before the Court on May 29,
1 ^%, l<» tin n idcntiary heanng tor the purpose of finding facts on the issues set forth in the
Ordei Gi intmg \ppell ml

hilr1

1

W* Mntinn

< »n lh.il sjttir d a \ , the c o m p a n i o n case
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entitled State v. Mecham, Case No. 961700230 (Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 970013CA), also came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 23B. At the evidentiary hearing on the above-entitled matter, the State
was represented by Mr. David Cole, Deputy Davis County Attorney, and Defendant, Philip
Earl Hollen, was present and represented by appointed appellate counsel, Mr. Scott L
Wiggins. In addition, at the evidentiary hearing in the companion case of State v. Mecham,
the State was represented by Mr. Steven Major, Deputy Davis County Attorney, and
Defendant, Jeffery Devon Mecham, was present and represented by his attorney, Ms.
Christine Decker. All parties and counsel stipulated that evidence and testimony presented
in one case would be admissible in the other.
On August 13, 1998, Findings of Fact from the evidentiary hearing were entered.
Thereafter, on August 24, 1998, Mr. Hollen, through counsel, filed a Motion to Amend
and/or Clarify Findings of Fact together with a supporting memorandum. The State did not
respond. The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Amend and/or Clarify Findings of Fact
on December 8, 1998. At the hearing, Mr. Hollen was present and represented by counsel,
Scott L Wiggins. Mr. Mecham was not present but was represented by newly appointed
counsel, Ms. Laura K. Thompson. The State was represented by Mr. William K. McGuire.
During the hearing, the Court granted the Motion to Amend and/or Clarify Findings of Fact
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i

,M r i^.i;ji..

memorandum on the

other requested amendments or clarifications to the Finding of Pmi

t I i I Vrniiillin I '•!,

1998, Mr. Hollen, through counsel filed a Supplemental Memorandum as directed by the
("run I I lie State did not respond.
The ( Viurf li;i\ inj? heard Ihr n„ idnuv .ind Innnf hilly .ids r.ni in the premises finds the
facts as set forth below.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1

Inthri\irh iiionimi1 IIOIII, on nun / K JVO \ inc Cinemark 10 movie theaters

in Layton, Utah, was robbed by two men.
2

V Witnesses gave descriptions of the two robbers. Among other things, they

described out: as blond and wearing cowboy boots. The witnesses described the other as dark
with Hispiin11> • oloini" and v CM""" » v hiU1 jviii/e bandage IM In? lell check

I lie robbers

were described as using small .22-caliber semiautomatic pistols.
Here was no physical evidence found at the scene.
riollenan.

..

. A ;.v.,-

considered by police.
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vLchamwere

5.

One suspect, Mr. Michael Cantu, was dark complected with Hispanic coloring

and was seen with a gauze bandage similar to the one described by witnesses as being worn
by one the robbers.
6.

The Layton City Police Department assembled a black and white photo lineup

that included a picture of Mr. Cantu, which was presented to witnesses. A subsequent color
photo lineup was also performed with a picture of Mr. Cantu. Certain witnesses picked Mr.
Cantu's picture and identified it as looking like one of the robbers. One witness, Ms. Megan
Brimhall, had a frightened emotional reaction to the color picture of Mr. Cantu when shown
the picture.
7.

Based upon that information, Mr. Cantu was arrested and a physical lineup was

conducted. At the physical lineup, one of the witnesses, Ms. Heidi Maroney, identified Mr.
Cantu as both the person that sounded like and was most like the robber with the bandage.
Mr. Cantu was subsequently released.
8.

A second individual, Mr. Dennis Dougherty, also became a suspect when a

search of his residence revealed gauze bandages and cowboy boots similar to those worn by
the robbers. A photo lineup that included Mr. Dougherty's picture was prepared by the
police and shown to witnesses. None of the witnesses could identify Mr. Dougherty as one
of the robbers.

4
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9.

i.,:*

. h, Si;iii alter tiie robbery, in October 1995, the Layton City Police

Department v\ns ronlai Inl h] ,S,ili I ala ( ill1, PnliiT 1 )epat1t!inil ami aiicu [he aaiiifs oil IVJr.
Hollen and Mr. Mecham as suspects because of their alleged involvement- MI similar
robbeiiO* sn Salt Lake County.
10.

Deu-.

f

Gardner oi tnc La vioiK *;> iw «c i department prepared a color

photo lineup containing six photoi

h

I In1 piehnes

were aF of similar dimension and general appearance.
11.

Detective Gardner presented the photo lineup to each w itness. Eacli of the

sn ni << illnesses idnilitlnl lihc |ilnnii nil Mi i inllcn .is being one ol the lubbers,
12.

Mr. Hollen was subsequently charged w ith aggr,

• 1

kidnaping, and aggravated assault in conjunction with the J une 25, 1995, robber) ot the
( ...,!!i;...\ ,;.. iiieaiei^ \u i.ayton.
1

son on a parole

violation.
1,4

Mr. William,, Albright, a public defender; w as appointed to represent Mr.

I Inllcn.

15.

Mi Mecham was ai^o -MTM

Cella, a public defender, was appointed to represent M...

A*.
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16

Mr. Albright and Mr. Cella worked closely on the cases and discussed in detail

the cases and strategy they intended to use.
17.

Mr. Albright received copies of all police reports and witness statements and

reviewed them.
18.

A preliminary hearing was held for Mr. Hollen and Mr. Mecham on March 27,

1996. Mr. Hollen and Mr. Mecham were present and represented by their respective
appointed attorneys.
19.

At the Preliminary Hearing, Detective Gardner from the Layton City Police

Department testified and was cross examined by Mr. Albright and Mr. Cella. Detective
Gardner testified about the procedure followed in presenting the photo lineups to the various
witnesses. Mr. Albright was able to examine the actual photo array used by the detective to
identify Mr. Hollen.
20.

Detective Gardner also testified that the photo lineup was presented as six loose

individual pictures of similar dimensions, that the photos were presented to the witnesses
separately out of the presence of other witnesses and in no particular order, that the witnesses
were allowed to thumb through the photos, and each witness was asked whether he or she
recognized anyone having to do with the robbery, and that each witness identified the photo
of Mr. Hollen as being one of the robbers.
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21.

Th<\,

,

,,..,.,„ .. ,v,\itnesses present al the Preliminary Heanng. Mr

Albnght was not aware of the identit\ til (In i ^cwihwwvs puNcni ii Hn Pn hnnnaiy
Hearing. Although the eyewitnesses did not testify at the Preliminary Hearing, Mi. Albnght
>\as audie that the eyewitnesses recognized Mr. Tlollen and Mr. Mecham from the
Preliiiiiiii.il i, 1 It.1 ji in .1,. IIn iolilII i »
22.

After the Preliminary Hearing, both Mr. 1 lollen and IV11 Mr 11<1111 \M• i • I»i n111d

over for trial.
23.

Mi

Mini) Ii( lined a pn\aU mwstigaloi Io help with investigation and trial

preparation.
24.

On May 28, 1996, Mi. Hollen appeared in Couit for arraignment. \ plea of

not guilty was entered, and the case was set for pre-trial on July 2, 1996, and jury trial on
Juls I

l'»%.
25.

O n J u n e kj, 1 9 9 0 , M i . 1 L J I - « - -1 • •• "• « '"'

,

7;

'"• J

""""

!

«

Albright, from prison. The letter w as very v\ ell w ritten and ai ticulalc Mr. Hollen asked that
I i I \ III" ijjjil tin* I Mi l clla uonsidei the cases of State \ Lopez and State v. Ramirez as they
bore on the witness identification i I Mi MM ham in I Mi II II i

i il 1

IIMMIU

tiling

motion to suppress Mr. Hollen also suggested that Mr. Albnght and Mr. Cella look at the

7
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question of merger on the various charges. In addition, Mr. Hollen referred Mr. Albright to
Ms. Karen Stam, who was the public defender representing him in cases in Salt Lake County.
26.

Mr. Albright was already aware of the Lopez and Ramirez cases. He reviewed

them again and discussed the situation with Mr. Cella and contacted Attorney Stam in Salt
Lake City.
27.

Mr. Albright talked further with Detective Gardner about the procedure he used

in presenting the photo lineup, and he had his investigator interview each witness. The
investigator reported that all of the witnesses were firm in their identification of Mr. Hollen.
28.

Mr. Albright was aware that witnesses had looked at individuals in three photo

lineups and one physical lineup prior to the time they looked at the photo lineup in which Mr.
Hollen's picture was presented to them. Mr. Albright was also aware that Mr. Cella had
inspected the scene of the robbery, and that Mr. Cella had met there with the prosecutor and
five of the seven witnesses. While there, Mr. Cella interviewed the witnesses about their
observations as well as the circumstances and sequence of those observations. Mr. Cella was
able to observe the physical layout and lighting and even went so far as to run time
calculations on various aspects of the robbery. Mr. Albright discussed all of this with Mr.
Cella.
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29.

amirez case and matters required to be

considered in determining the reliability of an eyewitness iilrnlifir;iln HI I Ir \\ as JV, iiie lli.il
the v . Vn • T proof was on the State to show admissibility of an eyewitness identification,
,ii& . e; a motion to suppress the Court wras required to make written findings

v
and cur !•!.,.'•.•.

i

-

.

he receive, :i

evidence.
30.

Mr. Albright was jlso luare of the requirements of Lopez relating to

presentation i«l ph"l" lineups tui identification
31.

With aii ui

.

examined ilir itlentitVatiou f

Mr. Hollen In ligh: * .f the requirements of both Lopez and Ramirez. He concluded that the
procedure used i

selective Gardner in presenting the photo lineup was not unduly

.uuL.es*

tiollen 0\ me witnesses show^i ,* muh

degree of certainty. For those reasons, !». .-• chance of success.
:._

..... mat the tiling *•! .,Uu< a inotion would only have the effect of

educating the prosecution innrv ibr ml I

ill HM
I nul defense .11•*I M.IH illi ailv -li my

identifieatioh \\ itnesses yet another chance to rehearse their testimony and further solidify
their K:U;I.ligation

1- 11 * - - - _ —.
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33.

On July 12, 1996, Mr. Albright, along with Mr. Cella, filed a joint Motion in

Limine to prohibit the State in the instant case from "offering into evidence any reference
regarding the identification of the Defendant by the witnesses arising from their presence at
the Preliminary Hearing of March 27,1996 and arising out of the photographic lineup." Mr.
Albright and Mr. Cella also jointly moved to consolidate certain charges. The State
stipulated to both of these motions.
34.

Mr. Albright considered hiring an expert to testify about the short comings of

eyewitness identification but determined that he could do just as effectively with a cautionary
jury instruction on eyewitness identification. Mr. Albright and Mr. Cella submitted such an
instruction, and it was given at trial.
35.

Mr. Albright met with the Mr. Hollen on at least three occasions when Mr.

Hollen was brought to Court for various hearings prior to trial. He discussed with Mr. Hollen
the fact why they would not file a motion to suppress. Mr. Hollen agreed to follow Mr.
Albright's advice.
36.

Mr. Albright's investigator also met with Mr. Hollen at the prison on two or

three different occasions and discussed these same things.
37.

Mr. Albright discussed with Defendant his right to testify. From the beginning,

Mr. Hollen told Mr. Albright that he would not accept a plea bargain, that he wanted to go
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to trial

-

- . .•

f)osiiK.

little time discussing Mr. Hollen's right to testify wii
38.

. Albright spent

:-•

Mr. A lbright was aware that Mr. Hollen had a prior conviction for aggravated

rohbi'i 'i , ami llial he had been on parole iiwiu piihuii at tla nmc of the robbery ii: June of
1995. He was

•

•

• :

.^bery

of the Million Dollar Saloon. In that case, it was alleged that Mi. iioihri - i

Ivnl

with Mr. Mecham, and that they had used small .22-caliber pistols. Mr. Hollen had been shot
in 11 ii it i .i' nt (lit* M L in. IV In vibright was also aware I hat Mi, Hollen was a suspect in the
robbery of Century Si IIK-JIIT" MI NJ!1 I Av ( "ihr.
39.

With that background, Mr. Albright recommended to Mr. Hollen that he not

testify, and Mr. Honen agreed to follow that advice. Mr. Hollen acknowledged that he did
"I vi .Hi'! In kstil'y III) llit I'LI/OHI mil iiCllii picsenee oi thejury at the ume oi trial.
40.

During Mr. Albni*u,'s testimony

u n w\ ihr Kulr "MM c\ iilniliitr, Ik'Hi'iny,

the first reason given by Mr. Albrmht Uv •:. * .. anting to have Mr. I Mien testify at trial was
iliai, buMid in his investigation, he did not want Mr. I lollen to testify because "he was the one
that committed this crime "

Mi

Mbnj'hl I .isi'ii h . <l I-i ntiiiiln

I \\\\

ii Ii

investigation, but on the fact that Mr. Hollen "had a similar charge in Salt Lake for armed
robbery . and that Mi. I lollen had the same co-defendant in his Salt Lake County case as he
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had in this case. Mr. Albright grounded his determination that Mr. Hollen had committed
the crime on the fact that "[h]e never denied the offense."

According to Mr. Albright's

testimony, this was the "first" reason or basis for "feelings" that Mr. Hollen should not testify
at the trial.
41.

At trial, seven witnesses testified and identified Mr. Hollen as one of the

persons who had robbed them. He was convicted and this appeal followed.
42.

At the time of the trial, Mr. Hollen was 34 years old, had served a term in

prison for aggravated robbery, was a high school graduate, and had accumulated about half
the credit hours necessary for a bachelor's degree in English.
43.

Mr. Albright and Mr. Hollen got along very well during the period that Mr.

Albright represented Mr. Hollen, and Mr. Hollen relied on him and followed his advice.
44.

None of the issues raised by Mr. Hollen were raised at the time of trial and he

did not raise such issues in the presence of the Court at the time he waived his right to testify.
45.

Mr. Albright has been a practicing attorney for some seventeen years. He is

licensed to practice law in California, Utah, and Arizona. He practiced for five years as
public defender in Salt Lake County and was a prosecutor with the U. S. Attorney's office
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and the Utah Attorney General's office for approximately three years. Mr. Albright has been
a Davis County public defender for approximately nine years.
DATED this ^S**day of March, 1999.
BY THE COURT

Judge Rodney S. Page
Second District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

William K. McGuire
Deputy Davis County Attorney
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I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to be hand-delivered
a true and correct unexecuted copy of the foregoing RULE 23B EVIDENTIARY HEARING
FINDINGS OF FACT to the following on this _Qib. da Y of March, 1999:
Mr. William K. McGuire
Deputy Davis County Attorney
Court Complex
800 West State Street
Salt Lake CityrUT\S3&25

CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to be forwarded by
facsimile a true and correct unexecuted copy of the foregoing RULE 23B EVIDENTIARY
HEARING FINDINGS OF FACT to the following on this ftf) day of March, 1999:
Ms. Laura K. Thompson
Facsimile NXT80TW4-7706
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